1. The Manchu rulers between 1600 and 1800 made a unique contribution to the creation of the largest consolidated and administratively viable multiethnic empire in China's long history. 2. The unprecedented population growth during that empire-building period was itself the outcome of more than one century of peace, prosperity, and a series of Even the most basic factors accounting for the decline and fall of the Ch'ing were somewhat different from those that brought down the earlier dynasties. Internally, the unforeseen population explosion created a new set of social and economic problems with which the existing fund of technological knowledge failed to cope. Externally, Ch'ing China was being drawn into a maelstrom of modern world politics by the West, whose culture was in many ways equal to hers and in some crucial ways superior to hers. It was the convergence and interplay of these unprecedented crises that finally brought about the downfall of an otherwise rather remarkable dynasty.
In spite of the constraints under which this paper was prepared, I decided to make it broad-gauged, multidimensional, and sweeping, but intellectually responsible down to even many a necessarily tacit comparison between the Ch'ing and earlier dynasties. For only by planning my paper in this way could I hope to make it fulfill the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of my key title word "significance," in the sense of "full of meaning or import." And only by planning my paper in this way could I clearly suggest what I meant by the accompanying diachronic phrase "in Chinese history." Professor Rawski's "Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing in Chinese History" is basically a monothematic bibliographical survey, which is generically quite different from my macrohistorical perspective. I might have ignored it but for the following reasons. Since a complex macrohistorical perspective can be legitimately challenged only by a comparable perspective, what is one to make of a critique that proceeds reductively from a monothematic bibliographical survey? What is one to make of a bibliographical survey that does not always truthfully represent the more balanced views of the authors it relies on? And what is one to make of major distortions of my argument?
A False Dichotomy: Rawski's Distortion of My Thesis
Professor Rawski tells us that she has chosen as her point of departure my assessment of the Ch'ing period in Chinese history. As a matter of fact, she considers only the third of my five basic points, manages to badly obscure its meaning, and2This remark was originally by Yii Cheng-hsieh and is cited in Ho 1959, 211. most egregiously-fails to acknowledge the clear recognition presented in the first of my five points: the early Manchu emperors in fact contributed profoundly to the growth of China as a consolidated, multiethnic empire. Although the term "multiethnic" was hardly in wide use thirty years ago, my article plainly referred to the achievement of the Manchus in the creation of an empire consisting of Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Zunghars, Tibetans, and various aboriginal groups in the mountainous southwestern provinces.
Governing China meant first and foremost developing the capacities to rule China's many hundreds of million of people, whose numbers increased dramatically between 1650 and 1800. Manchu success at this most challenging task was achieved in large measure by drawing upon a Chinese tradition of policies and institutions. Their relations with other non-Han peoples may not fit post-T'ang conventional notions of Chinese rule, but this hardly means that the core of their strategy of rule was not predicated on Chinese political principles. Recent research on Inner Asian dimensions of Ch'ing rule complements what we already have learned about Ch'ing rule within China's more densely settled and outlying territories. Rawski constructs a false dichotomy between sinicization and Manchu relations with non-Han peoples of Inner Asia. There is no logical reason to assume that what we have recently learned about Manchu activities means that what we already knew about their rule within China proper and Inner Asia is therefore mistaken.
To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, I should state explicitly that Chinese civilization certainly changes over time, in part because of internal developments and in part because contacts with the very peoples who become sinicized also expand the content of what it can mean to be Chinese. While there are certain elements of Chinese thinking and behavior that have an extremely long historical pedigree, Chinese culture takes on distinctive characteristics in different historical periods as the culture is itself transformed. I must also make clear that the growth of Manchu identification with Chinese norms of behavior and patterns of thought need not exclude other forms of identity. To pose such binary choices, as I think Rawski has done, distorts what individuals experience. Once again, Rawski's argument posits a false dichotomy between being Manchu and becoming Chinese.
Rawski rejects sinicization without putting in its place an explanation for what the Manchus did and said they were doing in ruling most of China. This failure severely limits her ability to explain how the Manchus were able to cope effectively with the largest population, most persistent political tradition, and most enduring civilization in world history. More fundamentally, her dismissal of the sinicization thesis makes it difficult, if not impossible, to locate the Ch'ing dynasty within the far longer span of Chinese history. Sinicization is a long, complex, and unending process. We cannot appreciate its force without going back to early Chinese history and prehistory.
"Rejection of the Sinicization Thesis": Rawski vs. International Scholarship
Prior to assessing the bibliographical survey contained in Rawski's address, I should do justice to its one useful aspect for beginners of Ch'ing history, namely, its listing of some Ch'ing palace archives and Manchu-language sources that have become available during the past twenty-five years. Of these, the most important is the chiin-chi-ch'u (Grand Council) archive, which enabled Beatrice S. Bartlett to produce Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council of Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723 -1820 (Bartlett 1991 , the best contribution to Ch'ing institutional history in any language. Although Bartlett in an earlier article talked about the quantity and "importance" of the Grand Council archive in Manchu, I judge from the archival category-names listed in her article that they are wide-ranging but probably of rather minor importance as compared to the entire series in Chinese (Bartlett 1985) . Similarly, other types of increasingly available Manchu-language sources are not quite of the nature and quality that Rawski would have us believe (Rawski 1996, 835; Crossley and Rawski 1993) . The judgment of the late Joseph Fletcher, who formed a Manchu class of seven students at Harvard in the fall of 1981, merits our attention:
Despite a certain amount of Manchu literary production in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including enormous translation projects and some belles-lettres, efforts to create a Manchu literary culture of stature had ended in failure. Manchu continued to be used in government documents in an increasingly formalistic and lifeless way until the twentieth century, but a Manchu education was of limited use. (Fletcher 1978,44) After acknowledging the useful portion of Rawski's bibliographical survey, we must now turn to its main theme: the multiethnic orientation of the Ch'ing empire, which she has traced back to the Khitan Liao (916-1125) dynasty of conquest. She generalizes thus:
Although the Liao, Jin, Xixia, and Yuan regimes employed Han Chinese in government service, each resisted sinicization. All four governments created their own scripts. (Rawski 1996, 837) Like the bulk of her essay, this passage is so nebulous and evasive as to call for careful scrutiny. If I understand it correctly, its "logic" runs like this: (1) she hopes that a mere mention of employing Han Chinese in government service would be a sufficient concession to offset the weighty opinion of international scholarship that all these four conquest regimes eventually became fairly highly or very highly sinicized; (2) hence, the noncommittal (in terms of outcome) statement "each resisted sinicization" could hopefully lead the unwary into believing that such nativist resistance was a success; (3) the "proof' of their success in resisting sinicization was their effort to create their own national scripts from scratch. When a passage of scholarly prose invites so many discrepant meanings, it becomes at best vague or confusing and perhaps at worst meaningless. Moreover, Rawaski ignores the fact that after a brief period of native resistance, the newly created scripts inevitably accelerated the absorption of Chinese culture, literature, and institutions, leading to the ultimate obsolescence of the scripts and any related claims for the development of indigenous culture.
The reasons for the failure ofJurchen script to create an adequate Jurchen literary culture are aptly analyzed by a specialist:
The primary impediment to the formal development ofJurchen ethnic literature was the literature of the Jurchen's nearest neighbor, the Han Chinese. Even before the arrival of the Jurchen, the mature, formal, and eloquent structure ofChinese literature had infatuated the Po-hai, Khitan, and other ethnic groups. These peoples abandoned their own languages and literary forms and adopted the Chinese language to articulate their own passions and thoughts.... The Jurchen were certainly no exception in this respect. By 1150 Han Chinese literary forms had already spread widely through the ranks of the Jurchen ruling house and nobility, relegating ethnic forms of literature to the narrow realm of the older generation and the lower classes. There is no need to cite extensively from the sizable multilingual literature on earlier dynasties of conquest to show the invalidity of Rawski's basic view. Suffice it here just to examine Rawski's most specific bibliographical statement: "The revisions of Qing history described above are consonant with the recent scholarship on earlier conquest states (Franke and Twitchett 1994)" (Rawski 1996, 836 There existed no "China" as a whole in the twelfth and thirteen centuries; rather, there was Chinese civilization that took on very different shapes in the north and in the south.... Traditionalism certainly contributed much to the emergence of a feeling of a separate northern identity. Once the Jurchen had given up trying to conquer the south, a sense of growing stability must have pervaded the intellectual elite, and it is strange that there were no widespread defections to the south, to the national Chinese state of Sung. It seems that the Chin state and its ruling elite developed a strong sense of their own legitimacy. They considered themselves to be the guardians of the "real" Chinese traditions of the T'ang and Northern Sung. The surprising endurance of the Chin against overwhelming odds after 1206, the survival of a state sandwiched between the revanchist Sung and the invincible Mongols, can perhaps be partly explained by the increased feeling of legitimacy that must have underlain the loyalty of officials and soldiers, many of whom preferred death to surrender.
The Chin confirmed their own inclusion in the legitimate succession of Chinese dynasties in 1203 when the government proclaimed that henceforth the element earth would be assigned to the Chin dynasty, succeeding Sung whose element had been fire. This might appear to the modern mind as a senseless speculation, but to every Chinese in the Middle Ages it meant much more: At the latest in 1203 the Jurchen State of Chin had, in its own eyes, become fully Chinese and a legitimate link in the chain of successive dynasties on the highest, if rarefied, level of cosmological speculation. This had taken less than a century to accomplish. But in that century the Chin had traveled the whole way from a rustic tribal society to a state that in many respects could be considered a fully legitimate element in the Chinese world order. Modern historians, too, might well consider Chin as more than just a barbarian interlude in Chinese history. There can be little doubt that the achievement of Chin, and the conviction of Chin intellectuals that they represented the true Chinese values, contributed much to the cultural vitality that enabled them to perpetuate Chinese ways of life under the crushing onslaught of the Mongols. (Franke 1994, 319-20) Instead of being "consonant with the recent scholarship on earlier conquest states" best exemplified by Herbert Franke, Rawski's generalization is actually diametrically opposed to Franke's. In fact, the sinicization of all earlier alien conquest states has been so generally taken for granted by the scholarly world that Jacques Gernet in his A History of Chinese Civilization, the most comprehensive single-volume treatise on Chinese history widely accepted in the Western world, discusses the Liao, Hsi-Hsia, and the Jurchen Chin under the chapter title of "the Sinicized Empires" (Gernet 1982) . To contradict international scholarship without being able to offer one's own superior erudition is astounding enough. But it is beyond belief that Rawski should have failed completely to anticipate that one needs only to make a simple bibliographical check to unveil her intellectual disingenuousness.
Sinicization: Phases, Facets, and Perennial Significance
The proto-Sinids made their debut in the Loess Highlands of North China about 9000 years ago. A millennium later neolithic Yang-shao villages began to appear in large numbers on loess terraces along numerous tributaries and small streams both north and south of the Wei River. The loess is porous, textually homogeneous, rich in minerals, and "self-fertilizing" (Pumpelley 1908, I: 7). It thus enabled Yang-shao farmers to practice sedentary millet farming right from the very beginning, in contrast to the slash-and-burn type of shifting agriculture that characterized the rest of the neolithic world. Consequently, from thousands ofYang-shao cultural sites discovered since 1949, it would appear that the density ofYang-shao settlements might be many times higher than those of any other region in the entire neolithic period, at least up to the beginnings of irrigation in lower Mesopotamia. It would also appear that from Yang-shao times onwards the impact of the early Sinids upon the surrounding peoples was already partially one of extent and numbers.
The typical Yang-shao settlements consisted of a centrally located large assembly hall, residential quarters, pottery kilns, and a cemetery noted for its neatly planned graves. The constant "communion" between the living and the dead gave rise to an ancestral cult which by the second millennium B.C. had become the most highly developed in the annals of men. This in turn stimulated a parallel institutional development, which finally resulted in the establishment of an extensive network of the tsung-fa (major-lineage-dominated) patrilineal kinship system shortly after the Chou conquest of the Shang in 1027 B.C.
The one focal value revealed in Chou literature and bronze inscriptions is the overriding concern of the Chou people for biological and social perpetuation. This is indeed to be expected of a people whose religious core was a most sophisticated ancestor worship. What is not so easily explained is that Chou literature also reveals a more ancient inclination of the Sinitic people to extend such strong concern for perpetuation from "self' to "others." Yu, the founder of the so-called Hsia dynasty who lived a full millennium before the inception of the Chou, searched out and ennobled the descendants of various ancient ruling houses, including one of the nonSinitic Eastern I (barbarian), in order to perpetuate their lines of descent and to ensure the continuance of their ancestral sacrificial rites.
As to the origin of this magnanimous spirit that was to guide the ancient Sinitic people in their intra-and interethnic relationships, we can at best only speculate because archaeological data are here mute. It is my guess that, since the loessic soil made it possible for large numbers ofYang-shao farmers to live closely together along numerous small streams, they had learned instinctively and empirically that the only way to avoid unnecessary violence and bloodshed was to respect each other's territoriality (as do primates and large carnivorous animals) and rights to survival. Psychically, therefore, the circle demarcating "us" and "them" was constantly being enlarged in favor of the former, once the benefits of peaceful coexistence were better understood (Ho 1996) . Over time, notions and norms that guided dealings among various feudal states and ethnic groups crystallized into what may be regarded as a unique Sinitic ethical precept, best expressed in Confucius' Analects: "Restore states that have been annexed and revive lines that have become extinct (hsing-mieh-kuo, chichiieh-shih) " (Lau 1992, 201) .
While this ethical precept could at best only mitigate the unceasing processes of annexing small and weak states by the large and powerful, it does help to explain how and why the ancient Sinitic world had kept on expanding. Mencius explains it best:
Shun [the legendary sage king before Yu) was originally an Eastern barbarian; King Wen [of Chou) was originally a Western barbarian.... their native places were a thousand Ii apart, and there were a thousand years between them. But when they got their wish, and carried their principles into practice throughout the Middle Kingdom, it was like uniting the two halves of a seal.
(Legge I and II: 316-17, with minor alteration in phrasing)
What Mencius really meant to say is that the original "Sinitic" group was relatively small and that any subsequent leaders of non-Sinitic tribes or states who adopted the original Sinitic way of life and contributed to its enrichment were retrospectively to be regarded as sage-kings of the progressively enlarging Sinitic world. This saying of Mencius suggests that long before the rise of Chou the fundamental criterion for defining membership in the Sinitic world was the awareness of a common cultural heritage rather than rigid racial or ethnic identity (Ho 1975, 344) . It is also prophetic because throughout the following millennia this deeply ingrained culture-orientation in interethnic relationships has largely accounted for the fact that China has become a state with fifty-six officially defined "nationalities."
From the standpoint of sinicization, China's long imperial age (221 B.C.-A.D. 1911) may be conveniently demarcated by the end of the Turk-dominated Five Dynasties and the inception of the Sung in 959-960. Prior to this watershed, the polyethnic empires of Han (206 B.C-A.D. 220) and T'ang (618-907) were the outcome of Chinese expansion and conquest. After 960 it was the aliens who succeeded in partial or total conquest of China. Although the alien dynasties of conquest-the Khitan Liao, Jurchen Chin, Mongol Yuan, and Manchu Ch'ing-have attracted most attention of Western students of Chinese history, the various pre-960 non-Chinese groups may have played a far more important role in the growth of China as a multiethnic state.
This may be partially shown statistically. The great steppe empire of the Huns (Hsiung-nu), which reached the height of its power around 200 B.C., boasted of between 300,000 and 400,000 horse-riding archers, not including a fairly large Wuhuan population enslaved by them for farm and sundry work. (Wu-huan was one of the Tung-hu, literally the "Eastern Barbarian," groups who belonged to the proto-Mongolic linguistic family.) This would mean a total Hun population of between 1.5 and 2 million. This figure takes on extra meaning when we realize that the then population of Han China probably did not amount to one-third of the peak former Han population of nearly 60 million in A.D. 2. In other words, the ratio of Hsiungnu to Chinese population is likely to have been 1: 1O. We find a similar situation in the early seventh century: a total population of 2 million for the Turkish empire as compared to a total of less than 3 million registered households during the reign of T'ang T'ai-tsung (627-49); and the Turks were but one of a score or so of non-Chinese ethnic groups within and without T'ang China.
What intrigues me the most is the situation in the fourth century, certainly the most chaotic in Chinese history. The incessant wars among various ethnic groups, devastation of large tracts of farm land, forced mass migrations, and recurrent famines and epidemics all exacted the heaviest toll on Chinese lives. On the other hand, all the major non-Chinese ethnic groups were of considerable size. There were well over 100,000 sinicized Huns who had been allowed to live along and within the Great Wall and who were the first to revolt against the Chin Dynasty and to establish a regional regime. The western part of the Chin empire, from Kansu, Kokonor, southwards to Szechwan and Yunnan, was teeming with Ti farmers and Ch'iang herdsmen, both of Tibetan stock. The one non-Chinese ethnic group destined to unify North China was the Hsien-pei, a major Tung-hu group. After groups of Northern Huns fled westwards to the Urals and beyond in A.D. 91, the Hsien-pei conglomerate had the numerical and military strength to incorporate some 500,000 or 600,000 Huns stranded on the steppe and also to absorb large numbers of their ethnic kin, the Wu-huan people previously subjugated by the Huns (Lin 1983, 152-53; Ma 1962a, 27) . In A.D. 258, when the To-pa Hsien-pei subnation began to become powerful, it boasted of "more than two hundred thousand horse-riding archers." In 308 the whole Hsien-pei conglomerate had more than 400,000 archers, which means an aggregate population of 2 million [Wei Shu, chap. 1, passim}. It is my conjecture that during this century of serious decimation of the Chinese population and of intense intermingling ofpeoples in North China, the ratio of major non-Chinese ethnic groups to the Northern Chinese might have been as high as one to five.
After the To-pa Hsien-pei founded the Northern Wei dynasty in 386 and reunified all North China thirty years later, peace in general prevailed. The various non-Chinese ethnic groups, which had been uprooted from tribal living within and without the Chin empire since the beginning of the fourth century, were now scattered far and wide and mingled daily with the Chinese population. The continual deportation cumulatively involving a million Chinese peasants and craftsmen to the Northern Wei metropolitan area of Northern Shansi took place simultaneously with efforts to relocate large numbers of Hsien-pei soldiers for settled village farming. Forces of acculturation went on apace throughout the empire, while the cream of the Hsien-pei tribal army was stationed in the six northern headquarters, keeping constant vigilance against the fierce marauding Jou-jan nomads.
Contrary to the necessarily gradual process of acculturation at the bottom of the social scale, the ethnic aristocracy was susceptible to Chinese cultural influence rather early. A classic example is Chin Mi-ti (d. 86 B.C.), a captured heir-apparent to a Hsiung-nu Shan-yii (great khan), whose political and personal conduct was so profoundly influenced by Confucian moral precepts that he won contemporary recognition as a paragon of virtue; his descendants chose to die as Han loyalists rather than to serve the usurper Wang Mang [Han-shu, ch. 68}. Since such non-Chinese ethnic groups as the Huns, the Ti, and Ch'iang had been permitted to continue their tribal mode of living inside China since the first century B.C., it is to be expected that in the course of time their great and lesser chiefs knew the Han Chinese language. But I am surprised to learn that practically all of the leaders of various major nonChinese ethnic groups of the early fourth-century were not only well-versed in Chinese classics and history, but also took Chin Mi-ti as their role model. In spite of their inevitable involvement in the scramble for power which led to the rise and fall of a number of non-Chinese dominated regional states, their full acceptance of Confucian morals, norms, and of the Chinese imperial system as the only political orthodoxy indicates a considerably higher degree of sinicization than is usually expected of the "barbarians" [Chin-shu, ch. 101-3, passim}.
Although the dynasty-founding To-pa group was less sinicized than the two other Hsien-pei subnations, they also had to follow the logic of the time: to shift a largely nomadic economy to the Chinese type of sedentary agriculture and to adopt by increasing measure the Chinese imperial system and bureaucracy for better management of the majority Chinese subjects. Besides, culturally and institutionally sinicization would serve as a common denominator with which to homogenize the polyethnic subject population. For all these reasons, the Hsiao-wen emperor from 494 onwards embarked upon a policy of systematic sinicization, which consisted of such measures as the moving of the capital from northern Shansi to Loyang, which was the heart of the agricultural zone, the prohibition of Hsien-pei language, the use of Chinese as the lingua franca, the change of polysyllabic Hsien-pei surnames into monosyllabic Chinese ones, the abandonment of Hsien-pei costumes for Chinese-style attires, and the full-scale adoption of Chinese rituals and legal code. By forcing the Hsien-pei aristocracy to take up permanent residence in the new metropolitan Loyang area and by encouraging their intermarriage with Chinese noble houses, he succeeded in forging a close bond between the biethnic ruling class. All these were parts of longrange planning for a military conquest of the southern Chinese dynasty-the only way to gain legitimacy to supreme rulership of the entire China world.
Emperor Hsiao-wen did not live to see the realization of his ultimate goal. On the contrary, full-scale sinicization in the Loyang area made the Northern Wei court, aristocracy, and officialdom increasingly extravagant and effete. The subsequent negligence and degradation of the Hsien-pei rank and file at the six northern garrison headquarters precipitated a strong nativist revolt that lasted ten years and finally brought down the Northern Wei dynasty in 534. North China was politically divided into an eastern and a western state until the former was annexed by the latter in 577.
Initially, both the eastern and western states had to vie with each other in attracting the broken-up units of the northern garrison forces. While the east~emained strongly nativist and prejudiced against the majority Chinese population, the west carried out a policy of appeasing the nativist sentiments of the traditional Hsien-pei elements, on the one hand, and of generating a sense of Hsien-pei-Chinese solidarity, on the other. At the bottom, the "privilege" of military service was extended to propertied Chinese farmers, the backbone of the newly 'created Chinese fu-ping army, so as to broaden the social and ethnic base of armed forces. At the top, the policy of power-sharing and intermarriage between the Hsien-pei and Chinese aristocracy was so successful that it was precisely this so-called Kuan-Lung (Shensi-Kansu) bloc that finally reunified all China and founded the Sui-T'ang multiethnic empires.
The greatest political and military genius produced by this northwestern biethnic bloc was Li Shih-min (597-649), the second ruler but the real founder of the T'ang dynasty. Since his grandmother and mother were Hsien-pei, he was genetically 75
percent Hsien-pei, though legitimately Chinese. It was from this multiethnic cultural milieu that he acquired a profound understanding of the traits and customs of the most powerful of the steppe peoples, the Turks under the Great Khan Hsieh-li. From various historical sources it can now be ascertained that as early as 617-18 he had already entered a sworn brotherhood with Tu-li, the second-ranking great khan and nephew and adopted son of Hsieh-Ii. I suspect he was able to speak Turkish because in the fall of 624 when Hsieh-Ii and his troops reached the north bank of the Wei River near the capital city of Ch'ang-an, he determinedly left his forces behind and rode alone without any escort to confront Hsien-li from south of the river, reproaching the latter for failure to observe the spirit of a previous oath. Then he dispatched someone to remind Tu-li not to forget the bond of "sworn brotherhood (hsiang-huomeng) ."3 This and many later accounts show that T'ang T'ai-Tsung was truly unique because the Turks and various steppe peoples genuinely believed that he was "one of them."
The most eloquent testimonial to the polyglot and multiethnic character of the T'ang empire was the assumption by T'ang T'ai-tsung of a second and entirely novel imperial title of "Heavenly Khan," upon the requests of vanquished Turkish khans and rulers of various other steppe tribal states and ethnic groups in the year 630, shortly after he had crushed the Eastern Turkish empire. An event of no less significance was the acceptance by T'ang T'ai-tsung in the early spring of 647, after a great deal of feasting and merry-making, of a plea jointly made by all attending tribal chieftains that a road be opened up between the northerly Uighurs and the southerly Turks, and be named the "Road to facilitate [various vassal peoples of the steppe} to make obeisance to their 'Heavenly Khan (Ts 'an t'ien-k'o-han tao) T'ang Chi, 198, 114} . From abundant T'ang records, there can be little doubt that this and many similar requests and gestures from the steppe peoples were spontaneous and sincere.
We can catch glimpses of the grandeur of the T'ang multiethnic empire from the top of the mausoleum of Emperor Kao-tsung (650-83) and Empress Wu (684-704):
halfway down the hill there stand at attention two symmetrically arranged groups of stone statues, each representing the head or envoy of one of the sixty-four vassal states that stretch 3,000 miles from Korea across the Eurasian steppe to the state ofTokhara, southeast of the Aral Sea. The rare sense of mutual belonging between T'ang T'aitsung and his multiethnic vassals and ministers can be detected from the ground plan of his own mausoleum, which was made in 636, thirteen years before his death: the mausoleum to be guarded in the north by statues representing fourteen of his loyal Turkish and other ethnic vassals and appended in the south by a very large cemetery consisting of tombs of some members of the imperial lineage, meritorious Chinese, and non-Chinese officials and generals.
For a proper historical perspective, one should search deeper into the significance of the system of "Heavenly Khan." Rawski, relying entirely on Pamela Crossley, contends that the origin of the "Khan of Khans" must be sought in Chinggis Khan and that "the 'Khan of Khans' was not a Chinese emperor" (Rawski 1996, 835). As is shown above, the archetypal Khan of Khans was the T'ang emperor T'ai-tsung's "Heavenly Khanate." E. G. Pulleyblank explains it best: "It established a separate basis of legitimacy for his rule beyond the Great Wall, with its roots in nomad conditions, and was not simply an extension of universalist claims by a Chinese Son 3This is most clear in the narrative recorded in T'ung Tien, 197, 1069; Ch'en Yin-k'o 1952 , suggests the year in which the sworn brotherhood formality took place in accordance with Turkish customs. of Heaven. Moreover, it had as its corollary the assumption, quite contrary to Chinese traditional attitudes, of the equality of barbarian and Chinese as subjects. This was a point of view consciously maintained and expressed by T'ai-tsung" (Pulleyblank 1976, 38) . Needless to say, T'ang T'ai-tsung's legitimacy as the Chinese emperor was never questioned, while later "Khan of Khans" such as Khubilai or Ch'ien-Iung, being "resident alien" in China, had to devise various political, institutional, cultural, and ideological means to legitimize their rulership in China. On the other hand, while later Tibetan Lamaist Buddhism could make Khubilai or Ch'ien-Iung "God" incarnate (Franke 1978, esp. 77-79), T'ang T'ai-tsung's Heavenly Khanate was a secular institution, though not devoid of cosmological meaning.
During the entire T'ang period there were altogether 369 "prime ministers" from 98 surname groups. Those of non-Chinese ethnic origins account for 9 percent of the total but constitute 17.4 percent of the aggregate of surnames-a record unsurpassed by any "Chinese" dynasty. No less unique in Chinese history is the fact that the various steppe ethnic groups, such as the Turks, Sogdians, and other Central Asians; the Khitans, Hsi, Koreans; and toward late T'ang the Sha-t'o Turks, consistently dominated the T'ang polyethnic army.
Other statistics, facts, and facets relevant to the study of sinicization up to and including T'ang times are either illuminating or self-explanatory.
The author of the phonetic dictionary Ch'ieh-yun, Lu Fa-yen, who completed this landmark work late in the sixth century, was a member of an aristocratic Hsien-pei family. China's greatest romantic poet, Li Po (? 705-62), was brought to Szechwan in his early boyhood by his Central Asian merchant father. More revealingly, the three lifelong friends and leading poets of late T'ang were all of non-Chinese ethnic origins: Po Chu-i (772-846), Yuan Chen (779-831), and Liu Yu-hsi (772-842) were respectively of Central Asian, Hsien-pei, and Hun (Hsiung-nu) descent. During Sui and early T'ang, the great architect Yu-wen K'ai was of mixed Hsiung-nu and Hsienpei descent. His contemporary, the architect Ho Ch'ou, who was commissioned to do the initial planning for the metropolitan Ch'ang-an (Ta-hsing in Sui times) area, was the grandson of a Sogdian merchant from Central Asia. Mi Fu (1051-1107), a great calligrapher and father of the splash-ink school of landscape painting, is very likely to have been of Sogdian descent too (Yao 1962, passim).
Not to be completely overshadowed by the north, the south that had remained Chinese throughout the pre-Tang centuries also produced its own share of preeminent persons. The aboriginal Hsi people of modern Kiangsi area could take pride in producing China's foremost pastoral poet T'ao Ch'ien (365-427), better known by the name T'ao Yuan-mingo The aboriginal people of modern northern Hunan had the honor of producing Ou-yang Hsun (557-645), one of the most famous T'ang calligraphers. If a dozen or so of these southern ethnic groups were pushed increasingly into the hills and mountains of inland Yangtze as the Chinese immigrants advanced, significant numbers of these aborigines had their compensation by becoming the backbone of the southern army, especially because the carpet-bagging Chinese ruling class was too effete and self-indulgent to lead the ranks. One of the stout ethnic generals who saved the nascent Eastern Chin dynasty from military collapse was T'ao K'an (259-334), great-grandfather of T'ao Yuan-m,ing.
A different kind of acculturation took place in the heavily garrisoned northern border areas. It is beyond the scope of this essay to outline the evolution of the T'ang army system. Suffice it here to point out that, with the impending collapse of the Chinese peasant army (ju-ping) system and its inevitable replacement by a professional polyglot mercenary army, soon after 700 there was the need to merge several normal provinces into one large military region for better coordination and efficiency. In order to check the power of the newly instituted military governors, the T'ang court finally decided to fill such posts only with non-Chinese ethnics of humble social origin on the theory that such men did not have political ambition. Consequently, in 742 An Lu-shan (d. 757), a Sogdian fluent in six steppe languages and dialects who was also a courtier, emerged as the most powerful of the northern military governors, with much of modern Hopei and southern Manchuria under his command. Although the great rebellion (755-62) he launched ended in failure, the T'ang court could never regain effective control of the northeastern provinces, which remained in the hands of virtually "hereditary" warlords, mostly of non-Chinese origins. The extent to which people of this northeastern region had undergone the process of "barbarization" may be reflected in the fact that henceforth they identified themselves more with the memories of An Lu-shan and his warlord successors than with later T'ang emperors (Ch'en [1942}; 1997,1:179-200) . Defying the national trend that literary attainments procured more and more social prestige, people in this northeastern region still valued such qualities as physical prowess and personal valor that make up good soldiery.
There was also another kind of "barbarization" that may be more correctly described as "Central-Asianization" or "Western-Asianization." Throughout the period 600-900 there was the continual introduction of Central and Western Asian music; dance; magic; acrobatics; polo; Turkish and other ethnic costumes; various exotic foods including grape wines, refined granular cane sugar, many types of pancakes and pastry; and certain nomad ways of cooking meats. In early T'ang it was fashionable to learn to speak and to act Turkish. The best-known case was the illstarred first heir apparent of T'ai-tsung, prince Ch'eng-ch'ien.
In the realm of interracial, interethnic, and interfaith dealings, the openmindedness and large-heartedness of the early T'ang Chinese are nowhere better shown than in the words of T'ang T'ai-tsung, who, after receiving the Nestorian monk 0 Lo Pen in 635, expressed his opinion on religions in general, including Nestorian Christianity:
The Way has more than one name. There is more than one Sage. Doctrines vary in different lands, their benefits reach all mankind. 0 Lo Pen, a man of great virtue from Ta Ts'in (the Roman Empire) has brought his images and books from afar to present them in our capital. After examining his doctrines we find them profound and pacific. After studying his principles we find that they stress what is good and important. His teaching is not diffuse and his reasoning is sound. This religion does good to all men. Let it be preached freely in Our Empire. (Fitzgerald 1935, 336) Although the specific circumstances of their introduction were not clearly recorded, Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism were equally welcomed into T'ang China. It may indeed be said that the spirit of tolerance and of cosmopolitanism exhibited by T'ang Chinese is almost the exact opposite to "Han chauvinism," arrogance, and xenophobia, which some students of Chinese history believe to have characterized the so-called "sinicization."
Broadly speaking, whether at the spiritual and philosophical level or at the mundane everyday level, the T'ang court and society at large seem to have well understood the futility of forced assimilation and the wisdom of "laissez-faire" in the sense of letting all ethnic and religious groups play themselves out in the same melting pot. The "final" outcome would be something that may be called "sinicization." Biologically and culturally, the almost complete absence of reference to such ethnic terms as Hsiung-nu, Wu-huan, and Hsien-pei, seems to indicate that they had long become "sinicized" or absorbed into the enlarged Chinese nation. Religiously and philosophically, a similar phenomenon is found in the case of Buddhism. Its pre-T'ang phase is nowhere more aptly described than by the title of Eric Zurcher's standard treatise, The Buddhist Conquest ofChina: The Spread and Adaptation ofBuddhism in Early Medieval China (1959) . As a result of centuries of adaptation to the Chinese milieu, Indian Buddhism finally became thoroughly "sinicized" in T'ang times, as may be evidenced by the maturation of such typically "Chinese" schools of Buddhism as the T'ien-t'ai, the Hua-yen, the Pure Land, and especially the Ch'an (Zen).
Before concluding the section on the T'ang, I would like to examine some available figures. Between T'ang T'ai-tsung's accession in 617 and the outbreak of the An Lu-shan rebellion in 755, a span of 138 years, the aggregate number of such steppe people as the Turks and the nineteen Turkish T'ieh-Ie tribes, the Koreans, the T'ufan Tibetans, the Tang-hsiang Tibetans (the Tanguts), and Central and Western Asians who were captured by the T'ang army or voluntarily submitted to the T'ang and were hence settled within China amounted to at least 1.7 million (Fu 1992,257 ). This total does not, of course, include those alien ethnics who chose to reside in China through normal channels, nor does it include those alien ethnics who took up permanent residence in China in the late eighth and ninth centuries. Thousands of Uighurs served in the T'ang army as mercenaries. After having helped the T'ang court to crush the An Lu-shan rebellion, many Uighurs became merchants and usurers. The number of Uighurs who eventually settled in Ch'ang-an and other cities of China is impossible to estimate. There were Persians in Ch'ang-an and Yang-chou by the thousands. A very large Arab population resided in Kuang-chou (Canton) in late T'ang. C. P. Fitzgerald summarizes thus: "the Arab and other foreign communities resident in the port were very large.... Abu Zaid, an Arab traveler who was in China towards the end of the T'ang period, relates that when Canton was taken by storm by the rebel Huang Tsao in A.D. 879, 120,000 foreigners, Arabs, Jews, Zoroastrians and Christians, were massacred, as well as native population of the city" (Fitzgerald 1935, 334) . The kind of true metropolitanism that characterized the life, outlook, and attitude of the T'ang Chinese is almost unique in world history, paralleled perhaps only by the Roman Empire from Hadrian to Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 117-80) .
In regard to early T'ang's basic principle in handling interethnic affairs, certain Western scholars hold views more critical than what has been presented in this section.
Let us analyze what is the actual meaning of the much-quoted Turkish inscription of Kocho-Tsaidam, which H. J. Wechsler thinks "eloquently relates the fate suffered by the conquered Turks."
The sons of the Turkish nobles became slaves to the Chinese people, and their innocent daughters were reduced to serfdom. The nobles, discarding their Turkish titles, accepted those of China, and made submission to the Chinese Qaghan, devoting their labour and their strength for fifty years. For him, both toward the rising sun and westward to the Iron Gates, they launched their expeditions. But to the Chinese Qaghan they surrendered their empire and their institutions.
(Cited and commented on in Wechsler 1979, 223) I have read six other Turkish inscriptions available in Chinese translation (Lin 1988, 241-86) , but the passage quoted above should enable us to get at the truth. When we realize that this inscription represents basically the nomad's nostalgia about the "freedom" of his mode of life on the vast expanse of the Eurasian steppe with the blessing of the lord of the boundless blue sky (Tengri), then such expressions as "slaves" and "serfdom" are merely metaphorical. What the inscription says about "the nobles, discarding their Turkish titles," accepting "those of China" is true because these Turkish nobles did receive at least comparable ranks and ample material rewards from the "Heavenly Khan."
What is more important is the fact that T'ang T'ai-tsung's success in playing the game of divide and rule was primarily due to great-khan Hsieh-Ii's cruelty and tyranny to his own people and also accidentally to unusually severe snowstorms that hit the steppe in the winter of 629-30. To do justice to T'ang T'ai-tsung, he prevailed over conservative opinion and decided to resettle some one hundred thousand surrendered Turks in the Ordos area without changing their tribal mode of living and commissioned more than a hundred Turkish nobles as officers of higher and middle ranks, several as generals. It was said that in the year 630 the total of Turkish officers at the T'ang court almost matched that of similarly ranked Chinese civil officials. Consequently, before long nearly ten thousand households of Turks came to reside in the metropolitan Ch'ang-an area " ch. 193, p. 907) .
In the spring of 630 when the great khan Hsieh-Ii was brought to T'ang T'aitsung as a war captive, the emperor, after reprimanding him for his acts of atrocity, not only spared his life but ordered that he be well taken care of by the director of the bureau of imperial stud horses for the remainder of his life. In 658, the Turkish general A-shih-na Ho-Iu, having turned traitor in plotting the great Turkish rebellion, was captured and offered to be executed at T'ang T'ai-tsung's mausoleum as a redemption for his ingratitude; the emperor Kao-tsung was so moved that he spared Ho-Iu's life and later decided to bury him beside the grave of his original supreme ruler, Hsieh-Ii great khan (Lin 1988, 115) . These anecdotes and many others go far to testify to the fact that early T'ang rulers treated alien subjects fairly, without discrimination but with feeling. As pointed out above, such genuine feeling for alien subjects found its expression even in the design of T'ang T'ai-tsung's mausoleum.
By way of summing up, the Han period initiated the policy of letting large nonChinese ethnic groups live along and within the northern and northwestern boundaries of the empire, a policy which in the long run familiarized them with the Chinese mode of sedentary rural life. It also brought about a surprisingly high degree of sinicization, at least in terms of knowledge of Chinese classics and history and acceptance of Confucian values and norms, of members of the ethnic aristocracy-a factor which might have mitigated the cultural shock of the Chinese during the fourth century A.D., when interethnic mingling and blending was intense and persistent amidst severe decimation of Chinese population. This century and the following fifth and sixth centuries A.D. seem to constitute a special chapter in which the blending of various streams of ethnicity in the bodies of the "Chinese" of entire North China may have reached an extent never equaled in subsequent Chinese history.
While the ratio of non-Chinese ethnics to the entire Chinese population at the height of T'ang prosperity in the early eighth century may not be as high as that during the fourth century, the acculturation between the various ethnic and religious groups and the Chinese went on at an accelerated pace because of the peace in the Eurasian steppe ensured by the system of Heavenly Khan and of the prevailing spirit of cosmopolitanism in the nation at large. Instead of reasserting the superiority of the Chinese political and cultural tradition as a force of forced assimilation of the aliens, the T'ang Chinese watched with amusement the adoption of certain steppe ways and customs by the playful aristocrats and commoners. They resigned themselves to the fate of "barbarization" of the northeast after the An Lu-shan rebellion, but welcomed with open arms the introduction of Central and Western Asian music, dance, food,
